Written by: Tom Ruys, UNA-Belgium (Flanders)

There exists no better indicator to predict whether a country will experience civil strife in the near future than the occurrence of conflict in its recent past: the typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces an estimated risk of 44 percent of returning to conflict within a period of five years.  Several factors account for this so-called 'conflict trap'; the economic collapse, the increased military spending and the intensification of hatred among various population groups that result from conflict situations are but a few of the relevant causes.

In recent years, the world has come to recognize that tackling state failure is a responsibility of the international community as a whole. Efforts to bring stability to post-conflict regions have increased strongly. Still, the overall picture has not been entirely positive. Too many frail states are left to fend for themselves because developed states have no interests at stake. In other cases, international efforts are withdrawn prematurely before a sustainable end state has been reached, or when the 'going gets tough' (as in Somalia or Rwanda).

Even when the highly-needed money is available, things do not always work out as planned. The billions of dollars invested in Kosovo, Afghanistan and especially Iraq have made this all too clear. The restoration of the outward symbols of peace and stability, such as the famous bridge between the Croat and Muslim communities in Mostar or the Darulaman palace in Kabul, does not necessarily guarantee that the underlying problems will be addressed. Moreover, endeavours are frequently duplicated or tend to focus overly on certain aspects of the peacebuilding project, especially the hard security sector, to the detriment of less visible clusters, such as the role of the media or the judiciary.

The Peacebuilding Commission provides a unique forum to address the problems described above. On the one hand, it can draw the awareness of states and public opinion to certain problem regions so as to attract adequate funding and to prolong the attention until the necessary conditions for sustainable peace are in place. On the other hand, it allows for coordination among all the relevant actors engaged in the peacebuilding process; states, regional organizations, international financial institutions and the relevant UN organs and experts. This should enable the Commission to develop ambitious and integrative strategies for reconstruction encompassing not only security, but also education, economy, justice, etc. This coordination could in turn help to reduce replication of efforts and distil best practices.

The Commission fills the existing gap in the UN system dealing with the transition from the initial military/peacekeeping phase to the long-term development phase. In doing so, it is certainly one of the most important and tangible accomplishments of the September Summit Outcome. However, certain limitations should not be overlooked. First of all, it is evident that the Commission is only an intergovernmental advisory body without any executive capacity. Its success or failure will therefore essentially be determined by the extent to which the relevant actors, in particular the Security Council, will heed its advice.

Secondly, the Commission's mandate is confined to post-conflict recovery. The exclusion of long-term development aid from its mandate seems warranted since other more appropriate venues already exist and since the Commission's mandate is rather ambitious as it stands. The exclusion of early warning and conflict prevention - which was originally foreseen in the blueprint of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change  - is more regrettable. Indeed, this modification of the original mandate may constitute a missed opportunity to centralize the UN's early warning capacities. After all, a streamlined approach to post-conflict reconstruction is a laudable end in itself, but prevention is still better than cure.

Apart from these two limitations, there are also several questions concerning the Commission's future that remain unanswered. Given the voluntary and hence precarious nature of the contributions, what will be the added value of the Peacebuilding Fund? Will the Peacebuilding Support Office be able to function effectively despite its budgetary constraints?  To what extent will civil society be consulted? Such consultation, which is 'encouraged' in the resolution establishing the Commission, seems vital to avoid the establishment of a NY-based ivory tower, unfamiliar with the realities in the field. Finally, one may wonder how many post-conflict situations will be addressed. Current estimates speak of some 4-5 cases a year. But it should be stressed that it is not the quantity of its workload that will establish the Commission's success but the quality of its reports, and, ultimately, the degree of implementation. 

In the end, it will not be easy for the Commission to live up to the high expectations and to realize its full potential. Yet the broad consensus in support of its creation demonstrates the determination of the international community to tackle state failure around the world. This, at least, warrants some hope that we will some day be able to break the conflict trap.

Mr. Tom Ruys is a Research Fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research with the Institute for International Law, University of Leuven. He is also a Member of the UNA-Flanders - Belgium.
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