Wednesday, August 9

  Movement in the Human Rights Council

by WFUNA on Wed 09 Aug 2006 11:29 AM EDT

Written by: Teel Lidow

The new Human Rights Council is already finding itself in the thick of things.  After less than two months of existence (the inaugural session of the council was held on the 19^th of June) the HRC is now faced with two major issues: rights of indigenous peoples and the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon.  Two days ago, the Council affirmed the declaration of rights of indigenous peoples with only Russia and Canada voting against the resolution.  This marks a major step forward for the indigenous peoples’ rights movement in the United Nations, which has been pressing for such a declaration for the last twenty years.  The resolution, newly bolstered by the support of the Council, will move to the GA for approval later this year.

The Council will also be convening to discuss the current crisis in Lebanon in the coming days.  While it is uncertain whether action will be taken (it seems probable since the Council recently admonished Israel for its actions against Palestinians in Gaza), this movement within the council is proving the effectiveness of the new Human Rights structure: the special session was called under the new guidelines, which require only a third of the member states to endorse a special session request (16 states of the 47 backed a request made by Tunisia on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference).  The difficulty of calling such sessions was one of the criticisms levied against the old Human Rights Commission.

Any action taken by the Council on the issue of Israel should be interesting to watch: while the international community has generally looked down upon the “disproportionate” Israeli use of force in the conflict, any action taken on behalf of the Council will be politically contentious.  This is mainly because the United States, which has already objected to the constitution of the new Council, recently reacted to the Council’s focus on and criticism of Israel by threatening to cut Human Rights related funding to the UN.  Any further action relating to Israel may bolster the movement in the US senate to make good on this threat.  The Council will meet on the issue later this week. 

Written by: Gray Southon, Special Officer for UN Reform, UNA New Zealand

There are common calls for the UN Secretariat to be more efficient, effective, responsive, open and accountable with high quality staff. While these are all desirable goals, it is not often realised that they come at a cost, and can substantially conflict with each other. Let us consider each of these characteristics in turn.
 
Efficiency refers to minimising the cost of specific activities (e.g., running a specific form of conference). One needs to specify the activities and ensure costs are accurately allocated to that activity, and eliminating any costs that do not contribute. Focussing on efficiency reduces flexibility and broad thinking.
 
Effectiveness refers to the impact on broader goals (e.g. increasing the success of dispute resolution) which are complex with diverse inputs. It requires a broader approach and coordination of many different stakeholders which requires spare resources and flexibility of objectives.
 
Responsiveness means that the organisation will respond quickly to changing demands. It requires the capability to assess changes and adapt to them, which requires broad thinking and flexibility. This also requires spare resources.
 
Openness means that people outside can know what is going on, and have an impact on decisionmaking. The provision of information that is generally understandable is expensive, and managing the subsequent response may be intrusive and disruptive. Especially in a highly political environment, stakeholders may have objectives which are not consistent with achieving effectiveness or efficiency. Openness can lead staff to be risk averse, avoiding politically sensitive issues, and confine themselves to easily defended actions.
 
Accountability refers to more formal reporting on activities and achievements normally based on pre-defined parameters, often on the basis of prescribed performance indicators. If the operation is at all complex, such accountability inevitably overlooks a substantial part of essential activities. A strong emphasis on such accountability encourages the organisation to distort priorities away from those activities not specifically addressed. Some forms of accountability carry with them penalties for substandard performance, such as budget cuts or staff changes, and can provide an incentive to bias the information provided.
 
Quality Staffing requires sensitivity to staff needs, not just in their employment conditions, but in the attractiveness of the working environment, such as the clarity of the tasks they are given, the level of support that they have in achieving their goals,  potential for taking initiative and the recognition they are given for their work. It needs to be the type of organisation that quality staff will want to work in. Unwarranted attacks, intrusive scrutiny, unreasonable constraints, unproductive paperwork, uncertain goals and inadequate support all increase staff frustration. Because of the very special characteristics of many UN activities, many skills can only be developed through long term experience, requiring considerable stability and support for long term careers.
 
All of these characteristics are important, and in an effective organisation are well balanced. However, external forces can disrupt this balance and degrade the organisation. It is important, therefore, in putting demands on an organisation, that one is aware of the potential impact. It was therefore of concern when the US placed the threat of a budget termination over the Secretariat, apparently ignoring the destructive effects of this uncertainty. Similarly, the G77 insistence on continued close scrutiny of the Secretariat by the GA, with no recognition of the destructiveness of such “micromanagement”, demonstrates a greater concern for their exercise of power than for the health of the organisation. Also, the highly politically motivated scrutiny which the SG and the secretariat were submitted to over the Iraq food for oil program is destructive of morale and integrity of the organisation.
 
Given such destructive forces on the Secretariat, one wonders what sort of person would offer themselves for the SG position. Would it be a person ignorant of the realities of this position, a person so enamoured with the attendant glory that they overlook such pressure, a person with an ulterior motive which justifies the pressure, or a person with the arrogance to ignore it. Further, the level that the current SG has raised expectations will make them difficult to fulfil. One hopes that a person with the required sensitivity and the wisdom is sufficiently forbearing to submit themselves to this ‘impossible task’. 

Gray Southon is an organisational analyst specialising in the health industry. He is Special Officer for UN Reform for UNA New Zealand.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) recently elected a president of the republic through democratic process for the first time since 1961. Mr. Joseph Kabila won the democratic elections earning 58.05% of the vote defeating his rival Jean Pierre Bemba.  The result was recently announced by the National Independent Electoral Commission and will soon be analyzed by the high court of justice.

Upon this landmark event in the DRC, what role did the UNA-DRC play?

According to Cissa Wa Numbe, the Secretary-General of the UNA of DRC, since the war started the following endeavors were undertaken:

1. UNA-DRC was engaged in advocacy campaigns and spreading information for peace,
human rights, justice, free press and media. Often this was a costly endeavor because some from UNA-DRC were imprisoned, the office ransacked and materials were seized.

2. When the UN came to the aid of an agonizing DRC, UNA-DRC restarted their activities that were suspended by force by the warlords. Then we worked in partnership with the UN mission in the DRC 'MONUC in areas of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Most of the role was to educate and inform citizens about the UN mission in the DRC and counteract the flow of misinformation. UNA-DRC launched an information, education and sensitization campaign aimed to mobilize public understanding and support toward the UN mission. UNA-DRC organized about 21 seminars, workshops and discussion group meetings within universities, schools, and with community groups/civil society organizations at the national and local levels. During this time, UN mission representatives came to speak directly to the public. UNA-DRC built bridges between the UN and Congolese people that opened a way to constructive dialogues between the two groups.

3. When the peace accords were signed, UNA-DRC immediately launched a conflict
prevention and peace building action program. For two years, UNA-DRC was a
leading civil society peace worker with the aim of supporting and promoting the
UN, international community and governmental peace process. This had been done through seminars, workshops, radio program and training, bulletins. In addition, UNA-DRC translated the peace accords into four national languages.

4. At the time of the elections, UNA-DRC was officially accredited with monitoring and observation status. Therefore, with support from UNA Sweden, UNA-DRC trained and deployed 386 national and international activists who monitored and observed both the parliamentary and presidential elections. UNA-DRC was the only national organization that was accredited to produce a report to the National Independent Electoral Commission on election observation. UNA-DRC concluded that the elections were held and organized in  a calm, free and fair way.

5. At regional level, UNA-DRC was the only UNA and amongst very few international voluntary organizations to have been accredited with official observer status to the International UN -African Union led peace, security, democracy and development process. This endeavor was led by Mr. Ibrahima Fall, the UN SG special representative in the Great Lakes region. UNA-DRC is attending all expert, inter-ministerial regional meetings as well as the heads of state and government summit. The next summit will be held in Nairobi, Kenya 14-15 December 2006. UNA-DRC has actively contributed to the writing of a number of protocols, which will be ratified by all regional states' parliaments and signed by the heads of state and government in Nairobi this December.

6. UNA-DRC concedes that the election it self does not mark the end of the process; rather the beginning of a new journey in a country that has seen two wars, 15 years of chronic instability. UNA-DRC believes that the country is entering a period of transition toward development and reconstruction with a goal to improve the health, education, and poverty of the Congolese. Due to its immense mineral resources Congo is an economic, and development opportunity. UNA-DRC strongly believes that the stability and peace of the newly elected democratic government will provide the key for the stability, security, peace and development not only for the Great Lakes region but also for the African continent. Therefore, UNA-DRC is launching an appeal to all not to abandon the DRC, or the pivotal UN mission.

7. The UN mission has proved its effectiveness; peace will always prevail if UNA-DRC is committed and united DRC. It has given hope and let people smile again. Many years of suffering have been replaced with new prospects for education, professional training, school, and normal family life! These are examples some of the things the UN has achieved in the DRC. The mission however is not over and UNA-DRC still needs the continued support for the new elected government by the UN and international community in order to ensure the Congolese people a bright future.

As for UNA-DRC, we are now focusing on the post elections and war period and UNA-DRC have put in place an action plan for the next 2-3 years based on the following key major issues:

1. Conflict prevention: reconciliation, mediation, and tolerance.

2. Good governance, human rights and democratic process: UNA-DRC need to establish a strong civil society 'watch dog' to pressure the DRC government to deliver its promises in areas of MDGS, peace, human rights, and democratic institutions and gender issues.

3. UNA-DRC will accomplish these tasks through capacities of building the following action strategies: education, training, empowerment, sensitization using seminars, workshops, advocacy campaigns, practical projects and activities with community groups and grass roots organizations. UNA-DRC will engage, equip and empower women, girls and young people to actively participate and contribute on equal basis.

Any one interested to hear and learn about this action plan and or to support us please get in touch.

Yours sincerely in peace

Cissa Wa Numbe
Secretary General
United Nations Association of DRC

Yesterday, the Peacebuilding Commission held informal briefings on the situation in Burundi and Sierra Leone – the two countries that the Commission decided to focus its attention on in its first session.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs from Sierra Leone, Mr. Momodu Koroma, outlined to the assembled delegates the reform initiatives that the Sierra Leonean government has launched since the end of the civil war in an effort to consolidate peace and establish a viable state with stable institutions. Sierra Leone has made respectable progress, as was emphasized by representatives from the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone, the World Bank and the IMF, in terms of developing and putting into practice a Governance Reform Agenda, a Peace Consolidation Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. However, Sierra Leone still faces many challenges, the most urgent of which are widespread youth unemployment, insufficient education resources, lack of human capacity, a weak infrastructure and the bad state of Sierra Leone’s cities. The elections in 2007, the fear of a relapse into violence (50% of countries emerging from war fall back into conflict within five years), and the questionable chances of achieving sustainable development are issues of concern to Sierra Leone and the UN. Therefore, Mr. Koroma expressed his gratefulness for the attention his country now gets from the PBC. He extended an invitation to the members of the Commission to visit Sierra Leone and evaluate the situation on the ground – a suggestion that met great approval and enthusiasm among the participants of the hearing.

A representative from Burundi’s permanent mission to the UN gave the members of the PBC a general overview of the country in terms of geography, population and demographics and the state of the economy. Regarding recent successes in terms of political stabilization and the consolidation of peace, he then discussed the negotiations that resulted in the establishment of the current Burundi government in 2005, and the ongoing peace talks between the government and the rebels in Arusha. A World Bank representative pointed to the country’s weak economy but insisted that with well-planned financial assistance the international community can make considerable improvements. Despite Burundi’s apparent economic and peacebuilding challenges, the mission’s representative could not clearly articulate any suggestions on the role the PBC should have in the country.

Written by: Momoyo Ise, Member of the Board, UNA Japan

The world is entering a new era, and I hope that the reform of the United Nations will be capable of responding to the global challenges that arise from it, such as the growing number of internal violent conflicts. In the UN reform debate, little attention is being paid to the important task of establishing an effective relationship between the UN and civil society. Yet, civil society and NGOs make essential contributions in the areas of humanitarian aid, peace negotiations, community development and various recovery-related activities, including the removal of landmines. Although the constituents of the UN are its member countries, a greater role for civil society and NGOs in peacebuilding missions could considerably enhance the effectiveness of the organization. UNAs could play a central role as intermediaries between the UN and civil society and help find solutions to complex problems of the 21st century.

The General Assembly established the Peacebuilding Commission in order to respond to the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation resulting in sustainable peace. The purpose of the PBC may be summarized as follows: (a) to bring together all relevant actors to consult on and propose integrated strategies; (b) to focus attention on construction and institution-building in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and (c) to help insure financing for early recovery activities. The establishment of the PBC is thus an attempt to prevent incoherent strategies and inconsequent field actions that have in the past resulted in wasting of funds and ineffectiveness in post-conflict areas.

The participation of all relevant member countries as well as the UN and regional and international financial institutions in the PBC has been ensured. With regard to civil society, the GA resolution 60/180, “encourages the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate.” I believe that the PBC cannot effectively realize its objectives and formulate relevant strategies without closely cooperating with civil society.

Real stakeholders, i.e. community leaders, residents of the post-conflict community, victims of the conflict, and actors providing aid to victims, need to play a major role in the peacebuilding process. In addition, consultations with those who are essential in the recovery and reconstruction process of the affected community, including teachers, legal personnel, merchants, etc. as well as relevant NGOs are crucial. While politically viable and neutral solutions are vital to the whole peacebuilding process, voices of ordinary citizens, particularly women who hold family together, must be heard and incorporated into strategies. Sustained peacebuilding and reconciliation must also include due actions addressing the psychological wounds caused by conflict, such as memories of brutality, hatred, guilt and shame.

“Citizen participation” doubtlessly brings some challenges with it. While the need to establish functional relations between the UN and civil society persists, a number of obstacles, including political hesitation, uneven capacities of NGOs, and difficulties in the selection of civil society representatives in light of the vast number of citizen organizations and groups, make this a difficult undertaking. Nevertheless, I hope the UN will address the issue of civil society participation as part of its reform agenda.

What UNA Japan could do more vigorously is to enhance people’s understanding of conflict situations and the living conditions of victims. A better comprehension of conflict will inspire the Japanese people to assist in community recovery activities. In particular, UNA Japan could educate young people about peacebuilding and its capacities.

Written by Baguma Tinkasimire Richard, General Secretary, UNA Uganda

The Peace Building Commission is a very welcome initiative and it is particularly important for us in Uganda situated in the Great Lakes Region of Africa which is plagued by conflict.

Uganda has been a theatre of a raging brutal rebellion led by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) whose leaders are indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Besides, Uganda has also been associated in various ways with the conflicts in the region.

However the governments in the Great Lakes Region have generally been critical of the role (or lack of it) of the United Nations in resolving the conflicts and pursuing effective post conflict strategies. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Rwandese Leader Paul Kagame have for example publicly described the UN in unflattering terms like "superficial", "useless".

Taking the example of the LRA rebellion in Northern and Eastern Uganda, several peace initiatives have been undertaken albeit unsuccessfully. Among the biggest challenges to these peace initiatives are narrow (selfish) interests of the stakeholders involved as well as the competition for profile, resources, recognition, etc among the peace activists.

These are challenges facing the PBC. Therefore mechanisms and strategies to tackle these challenges must be developed early enough in the life of the Commission to avoid paralysis and hamper its effectiveness.

Written by: Gray Southon, Special Officer for UN Reform, UNA New Zealand

One of the critical dilemmas involved in any external interventions in a country's affairs is the conflict between external and internal control. Any external intervention, involves reduction of internal control and loss of sovereignty, whether or not it is requested or how broad the consultations are. We need to better understand this dilemma and seek out ways in which the intervention can best enhance the internal political and decision systems. It is a process that we do not seem to have been very successful at yet.

Perhaps national UNAs could make a contribution to understanding this dilemma in each case.

Written by: Lawrence Woocher, Research Fellow, Center for International Conflict Resolution School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was originally conceived as a mechanism to help the UN identify, monitor and coordinate policy towards states at risk of collapse or violent conflict.  This broad vision for the PBC-generated by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change as part of its blueprint to address "the challenge of prevention"-was noticeably eroded in negotiations among UN member states.  The world's governments charged the new Commission with a mandate more narrowly focused on states emerging from conflict.  It will surely be a boon to these states.  But in rejecting a broader vision for the PBC, governments have missed an opportunity to strengthen global mechanisms for preventing fragile states from lapsing into conflict in the first place.

The High Level Panel's original vision of the PBC was quite broad and strongly oriented to prevention.  They found "a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and countries emerging from conflict."  According to the High Level Panel, this gap was relevant to "both the period before the outbreak of civil war and in the transition out of war."  The Panel concluded: "What is needed is a single intergovernmental organ dedicated to peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay close attention to countries at risk, ensure concerted action by donors, agencies, programmes and financial institutions, and mobilize financial resources for sustainable peace."

Secretary-General Kofi Annan endorsed the Panel's recommendation for a PBC in his report to member states, In Larger Freedom, but in modified form "based on reactions from Member States."  In recommending the creation of a PBC, Annan declared that there was "a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace."  Notably, the Secretary-General excluded "countries under stress" from the High Level Panel's original formulation, limiting his recommended scope to post-conflict countries.

Yet Annan did not entirely drop the notion that the PBC should contribute to prevention in states without a recent history of violent conflict.  While eschewing the Panel's suggestion to charge the PBC with a mandate for early warning or "operational prevention," the Secretary-General did list prevention as one of seven proposed Commission functions.  Specifically, he recommended that member states be able to seek advice from the PBC "at any stage" (i.e., including before the outbreak of violence).  In this way, according to Annan, the PBC would "add an important dimension to United Nations preventive efforts by providing better tools for helping States and societies reduce the risk of conflict."

Even this modest preventive function was apparently unacceptable to member states.  The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, produced through months of intensive multilateral negotiations, referred exclusively to "post-conflict" and "recovery" in relation to the PBC's functions.

Limiting the PBC's domain to states emerging from conflict makes little sense from an institutional design perspective.  After all, the fundamentally relevant category is not pre-conflict or post-conflict, but states at high risk of collapse or violent conflict, where effective mechanisms for international aid, advice and support are lacking.  Post-conflict countries are most commonly equated with these needs because the single greatest risk factor for future armed conflict is having a recent history of armed conflict.  But any state that can be reliably identified as being at high risk-even if they have not had a major violent episode in the recent past-would benefit from access to special mechanisms like those provided by the PBC.  Existing mechanisms for identifying and supporting these fragile "pre-conflict" states is weak and highly dispersed, leaving an institutional gap nearly identical to that for post-conflict countries: i.e., lack of coordination, poor mechanisms for marshalling funds strategically, limited attention of policymakers.

The door may be ajar yet to a more inclusive, prevention-oriented PBC.  The concurrent Security Council and General Assembly resolutions officially creating the PBC follow the exclusive focus on post-conflict reconstruction and recovery from the Summit Outcome Document.  But in spelling out how its Organizational Committee should construct the PBC's agenda, the resolutions stipulate that the agenda should be based on recommendations from four sources: the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General, and "Member States in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council."  This category of member states, importantly, includes those on the verge of "lapsing" as well as "relapsing" into conflict.  Thus, despite the PBC's clear post-conflict thrust, a state without a recent history of violent conflict could request the advice of the PBC, along the lines of Kofi Annan's recommendation.

Like all new intergovernmental bodies, the PBC's function in practice will depend on how states choose to use it.  Even though member states negotiated vigorously over every word of the Summit Outcome Document and the resolutions creating the PBC, these documents do not lead inexorably to a precise agenda or focus.  Thus, over time states could choose to use the PBC to coordinate advice and support for "pre-conflict" countries under stress as well as those on the path from war to sustainable peace.  Doing so would be a wise investment in the prevention of violent conflict and state failure.

Mr. Lawrence Woocher is a Research Fellow at Columbia University's Center for International Conflict Resolution, where he directs the Center's genocide prevention activities. From 2004-2006 he served as Program Manager of Global Policy Programs at UNA-USA.

Written by: Robin Halliday, UNA-New Zealand

The UNANZ supports the Peacebuilding Commission concept. The Commission will be a mechanism through which international actors - the UN, the international financial institutions, bi-lateral donors  - will be able to align their efforts.  The coordination of all relevant actors and resources makes available intergrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery, including in the areas of re-construction of infra-structure and institution building. This will provide increased streamlining and incorporation of all relevant departments, which will in turn result in a better sequencing of measures.  The Peacebuilding Commission will further provide consistency in Peacebuilding efforts. Interventions now tend to be of a "flood or famine" nature, with all the funding coming when the issue is "visible" and drying up when international attention moves on.  Overall, the commission should bring much needed coherence to the international response to failing or failed states.

Finally, the commission needs to further focus on potential roadblocks within the conflict states themselves.  For example, ethnic conflict perpetuation is not adequately addressed in the Commission brief despite its tendency to cause conflict to breakout again even, when the Peacebuilding structures are in place.  Government changes can also pose a problem to continuing peacebuilding efforts; as we have seen in the Solomons, incoming Government that can campaign on opposing "foreign intervention."  This often results in demands for withdrawal or an exit strategy before the peacebuilding task is complete.

Written by: Tom Ruys, UNA-Belgium (Flanders)

There exists no better indicator to predict whether a country will experience civil strife in the near future than the occurrence of conflict in its recent past: the typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces an estimated risk of 44 percent of returning to conflict within a period of five years.  Several factors account for this so-called 'conflict trap'; the economic collapse, the increased military spending and the intensification of hatred among various population groups that result from conflict situations are but a few of the relevant causes.

In recent years, the world has come to recognize that tackling state failure is a responsibility of the international community as a whole. Efforts to bring stability to post-conflict regions have increased strongly. Still, the overall picture has not been entirely positive. Too many frail states are left to fend for themselves because developed states have no interests at stake. In other cases, international efforts are withdrawn prematurely before a sustainable end state has been reached, or when the 'going gets tough' (as in Somalia or Rwanda).

Even when the highly-needed money is available, things do not always work out as planned. The billions of dollars invested in Kosovo, Afghanistan and especially Iraq have made this all too clear. The restoration of the outward symbols of peace and stability, such as the famous bridge between the Croat and Muslim communities in Mostar or the Darulaman palace in Kabul, does not necessarily guarantee that the underlying problems will be addressed. Moreover, endeavours are frequently duplicated or tend to focus overly on certain aspects of the peacebuilding project, especially the hard security sector, to the detriment of less visible clusters, such as the role of the media or the judiciary.

The Peacebuilding Commission provides a unique forum to address the problems described above. On the one hand, it can draw the awareness of states and public opinion to certain problem regions so as to attract adequate funding and to prolong the attention until the necessary conditions for sustainable peace are in place. On the other hand, it allows for coordination among all the relevant actors engaged in the peacebuilding process; states, regional organizations, international financial institutions and the relevant UN organs and experts. This should enable the Commission to develop ambitious and integrative strategies for reconstruction encompassing not only security, but also education, economy, justice, etc. This coordination could in turn help to reduce replication of efforts and distil best practices.

The Commission fills the existing gap in the UN system dealing with the transition from the initial military/peacekeeping phase to the long-term development phase. In doing so, it is certainly one of the most important and tangible accomplishments of the September Summit Outcome. However, certain limitations should not be overlooked. First of all, it is evident that the Commission is only an intergovernmental advisory body without any executive capacity. Its success or failure will therefore essentially be determined by the extent to which the relevant actors, in particular the Security Council, will heed its advice.

Secondly, the Commission's mandate is confined to post-conflict recovery. The exclusion of long-term development aid from its mandate seems warranted since other more appropriate venues already exist and since the Commission's mandate is rather ambitious as it stands. The exclusion of early warning and conflict prevention - which was originally foreseen in the blueprint of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change  - is more regrettable. Indeed, this modification of the original mandate may constitute a missed opportunity to centralize the UN's early warning capacities. After all, a streamlined approach to post-conflict reconstruction is a laudable end in itself, but prevention is still better than cure.

Apart from these two limitations, there are also several questions concerning the Commission's future that remain unanswered. Given the voluntary and hence precarious nature of the contributions, what will be the added value of the Peacebuilding Fund? Will the Peacebuilding Support Office be able to function effectively despite its budgetary constraints?  To what extent will civil society be consulted? Such consultation, which is 'encouraged' in the resolution establishing the Commission, seems vital to avoid the establishment of a NY-based ivory tower, unfamiliar with the realities in the field. Finally, one may wonder how many post-conflict situations will be addressed. Current estimates speak of some 4-5 cases a year. But it should be stressed that it is not the quantity of its workload that will establish the Commission's success but the quality of its reports, and, ultimately, the degree of implementation. 

In the end, it will not be easy for the Commission to live up to the high expectations and to realize its full potential. Yet the broad consensus in support of its creation demonstrates the determination of the international community to tackle state failure around the world. This, at least, warrants some hope that we will some day be able to break the conflict trap.

Mr. Tom Ruys is a Research Fellow of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research with the Institute for International Law, University of Leuven. He is also a Member of the UNA-Flanders - Belgium.
For more, click here>>
For Tom Ruy's website, click here>>

The PBC - a synergistic approach 

In his remarks on the General Assembly's endorsement of the Peacebuilding Commission in New York, 20 December 2005‚ the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan states:
"It will improve coordination both within and beyond the UN system. It will develop best practices and ensure predictable funding. Perhaps most important of all, it will liaise with the international community to keep us all engaged in the long term recovery effort."

Indeed‚ as an advisory subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and the Security Council‚ the Peacebuilding Commission will advise and propose integrated strategies for aiding countries that are emerging from conflict‚ focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development.

Paragraph 21 of the Resolution 60/180 adopted by the General Assembly establishing the  Peacebuilding Commission  specifically encourages it to consult with NGOs and other players within civil society, as well as all donor organizations and relevant contributors such as the international financial institutions.

Peacebuilding and Haiti
Peace and conflict have different meaning for people living under diverse conditions and post-conflict situation vary from place to place. By building consensus and improving coordination of efforts among the many actors‚ the Peacebuilding Commission will likely improve the overall efficiency of its intervention. It can tailor its activities on a case by case basis during difficult post-conflict years when the economies and institutions of assisted countries are extremely weak and vulnerable. Without this approach the actions of the Commission will be ineffective.

Haiti is a classic example of the UN at work:

Intervention and peacekeeping missions:
The UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (1993-2000) has not been easy. Its few successes have been tempered by a number of failures. The intervention was well intentioned‚ however‚ UN decision-makers were either biased or misinformed in failing to consider critical elements at play within the country. There were no armed conflicts threatening the peace, or warfare between Haiti and her neighbors‚ as has occurred in many places far more dangerous but never subjected to UN peacekeeping intervention. A lengthy embargo was imposed as a sanction against Haiti‚ without any consideration of the adverse socio-economic and humanitarian consequences for the population‚ in a futile attempt to force out of office an illegitimate government and reinstate a dethroned ruler.

The UN most recent mission (2004 - to date) so far is falling short of expectations:
For the most part, decisions are taken without adequate consultation with people for whom some issues mean life or death. For most Haitians‚ peace implies not only the absence of war, but the absence of all kind of violence. It means harmony and acknowledgement of the dignity of all human beings in a holistic way. And it also means a condition that offers people hope for the future. 

Examples of conflict in Haiti
Haiti has many potential sources of conflict including:

•  land disputes‚ neighbor encroachments and property damages;
• tension between the "haves and have nots" that translate into deep political divisions and ongoing struggle for scarce resources;
• high levels of illiteracy and poverty‚ that obscure the advantage of Democracy. Everyone   wants  to be part of the ruling group‚ but once elected or selected‚ nobody wants to give up power peacefully;
• lack of respect for basic rights and civil liberties.
  Hence‚ the biggest challenges to peace in Haiti are unemployment‚ illiteracy‚ human rights violations‚ corruption and political treachery.
  How could the PBC change the landscape in Haiti?

The newly created Commission can make an encouraging and significant first impression by:

• consulting with all relevant actors previously excluded‚ including members of the Haiti Diaspora;
• advising the Security Council to urgently redefine the current UN mission in Haiti in conformity with its stated mission of ensuring peace by focusing attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development.

How can UNA-Haiti be of assistance?As a membership organization made up of nationals in Haiti as well as expatriates and foreigners‚ UNA-Haiti can:

• help develop programs tailored for full cultural relevancy and situational applicability;
• create networks of people to work together to generate a consciousness and awareness of what is necessary to avoid a rupture in our collective vision of peace and harmony;
• encourage policy-makers and the civil society‚ including women's groups‚ NGOs and the private sector to support the work of the Peacebuilding Commission‚ particularly its conflict-prevention efforts;
• help in building the capacity for effective peace builders through training, and organize seminars to educate people on dispute resolution processes and human rights issues.
  By improving coordination of activities among all the relevant players‚ the Peacebuilding Commission would be able to help Haiti in this new effort at national reconstruction.

Mr. Fritz Simon is co-founder of the UNA-Haiti. He has been a life-long civil and human rights activist and  peace-advocate. He spent 21 years in exile in the United States during the Duvaliers' era and  returned to Haiti in 1986. As a candidate, he participated in Haiti's presidential elections of December 16, 1990.
 Mr. Fritz Simon is currently serving as  Secretary General of UNA-Haiti. For more, click here>>

In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that, in the case of an inter-state war, post-conflict peace-building should be operationalised in the form of concrete cooperative projects linking countries through mutually beneficial activities which contribute not only to economic and social development but also enhance confidence vis-à-vis each other: "I have in mind, for example, projects that bring States together to develop agriculture, improve transportation or utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share or joint programmes through which barriers between nations are brought down by means of freer travel, cultural exchange and mutually beneficial youth and educational projects. Reducing hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to fore-stall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities" (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, op.cit., An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, para.56).

All of these measures are necessary in order to prevent a recurrence of a crisis or a conflict. The concrete project examples mentioned by the Secretary-General clearly indicated that a full engagement and attention of all components of the United Nations system are a conditio sine qua non in order to implement the concept of post-conflict peace-building in a successful way. Besides the Security Council, other principal organs such as the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) must take over responsibility as well as the UN funds and programmes such as UNICEF, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Specialized Agencies such as UNESCO, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and - last not least - the Bretton Woods institutions such as the World Bank and its affiliates.

Kofi Annan, continued to operationalize the concept of post-conflict peace-building. In his report on "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform" of 14 July, 1997, he informed the member states that he has designated the Department of Political Affairs to serve as the UN focal point for post-conflict peace-building - "that is, the mechanism for ensuring that United Nations efforts in countries that are emerging from crises are fully integrated and faithfully reflect the mission objectives specified by the Security Council and the Secretary-General." (Kofi Annan, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc. A/51/950, 14 July 1997, para.66).

In the same report, Kofi Annan referred to the UN Charter which provides that the UN should draw in its work on a decentralized system of Specialized Agencies. He stated that, according to the Charter, the authority of the UN over their policies and activities is limited to making recommendations for their coordination and postulated that, "if the objectives of the UN are to be fully realized, a much greater degree of concerted will and coordinated action is required among the system as a whole" (Kofi Annan, op.cit., para.86).

On 20 December 2005, the Security Council and the General Assembly adopted similar concurrent resolutions establishing a new UN Peace-building Commission. This committee will marshal resources at the disposal of the international community to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, and will promote coordination among all actors involved in assisting the recovery of a country both from within and outside the UN system (Resolution 1645 (2005) adopted by the Security Council at its 5 335 meeting on 20 December 2005; Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: 60/180. The Peacebuilding Commission - 66th plenary meeting, 20 December 2005).  With the introduction of such an organization, Kofi Annan and others stated that an institutional gap had been bridged. It is hoped that the newly founded Commission will improve coordination within the UN system, develop best practices and ensure predictable funding. Of course, there is no doubt that the establishment of the Commission fullfils a key outcome of the 2005 World Summit which committed the UN Member States to creating it by the end of 2005.

But it should be kept in mind that the "institutional gap" cannot substitute the functional gap which is related to the multi-dimensional concept of peace-building and its problems of operationalization. So far, no provisions on peace-keeping operations can be found in the UN Charter. After the failures of intra- and inter-administrative mechanisms within the UN Secretariat and through the UN System's Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) as reflected in the mixed results of post-conflict peace-building over the last 15 years, an intergovernmental body assisted by the proposed small Peace-building Support Office (with staffing being funded from existing, already tight resources from the Secretariat) signals a new, but modest start. It is the beginning of another attempt to implement the complex concept of peace-building by bringing all relevant actors on board, including the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund).

In the past, the major weakness has been the lack of financial resources. A standing Peace-building Fund will be established and funded through voluntary contributions. However, the amount of 250 Mio. US dollars as mentioned in the recommendations of the High-level Panel can only serve as a kind of "seed money" in order to address critical funding gaps during the early stages of the recovery process. And it should also be kept in mind that Kofi Annan's proposal of selecting members from the major donors to the standing Peace-building Fund "got lost" during the negotiations.

The fact that the international financial institutions are several times explicitly mentioned in the resolution indicates the necessity to include them as important partners in the peace-building process. To what extent they actually are willing to get involved in concrete peace-building operations within those negotiations remains, however, an open question. This is also the case of other Specialized Agencies as well as Special Funds and Programmes which have to consult their own autonomous decision-making bodies.

Given the commitments of the Member States it can only be hoped that the newly established Peace-building Commission will function efficiently and in an effective way. In other words, the founding of the Commission was a necessary step in the right direction, but it is not a sufficient one. Because without the willingness of the UN Member States to agree upon some major revisions of the Charter which would also bring the "UN family" more closely together under one roof (= "system-wide coherence") post-conflict peace-building  measures will, unfortunately, remain half-hearted, completely under-financed and thus unsuccessful.

Mr. Klaus Hufner is a former University Professor (Freie Universität Berlin), an Honorary President of WFUNA, a Member of the Executive Committee of the German Commission for UNESCO, a Senior Research Fellow of the Global Policy Forum, and Chairman of the Advisory Board of UNESCO-CEPES. For more, click here>>